{"id":10369,"date":"2025-05-29T05:44:40","date_gmt":"2025-05-29T01:44:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/agrcenter.com\/?p=10369"},"modified":"2025-06-21T18:25:55","modified_gmt":"2025-06-21T14:25:55","slug":"how-did-russia-exploit-the-erosion-of-frances-image-to-encroach-on-africa-4","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/agrcenter.com\/en\/how-did-russia-exploit-the-erosion-of-frances-image-to-encroach-on-africa-4\/","title":{"rendered":"A Quadruple Complaint Against Sudan \u201cWithout Legs\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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I was stopped by a post claiming that some of Sudan\u2019s neighboring countries have filed a complaint with the Security Council against the Chairman of the Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. I paused for a long time in front of that post, not because of its importance, but to read the depth of the psychological defeat that overwhelmed its writer, and to understand the extent to which the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militias have reached, especially after the increasing number of their leaders being killed\u2014who were thrown into a battlefield they were unaccustomed to. I find myself in confusion, trying to describe the structure of these militias that are now facing internal fractures and external defeats.<\/p>

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The talk about a quadruple agreement to file a complaint against Sudan in the Security Council has become a recycled topic that will not achieve the desired gains, nor does it have any appeal except in the world of satirical cartoons. The international community itself has become exhausted, having realized that its bet on the Rapid Support Forces has lost its footing. The Sudan of the 1989 regime, which was isolated from the world for decades, spared no effort in building its military institutions and did not lack a leadership vision to develop special cadres to lead those institutions, whether we agree or disagree with them. The result of that is evident in this crisis. Had it not been for the resilience of the Sudanese national state and its military and civil institutions, the militias would have had another say today. So, thank you to Sudan\u2019s National Salvation regime.<\/p>

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Sudan\u2019s neighboring countries have started recalculating their political and security strategies after a flood of intelligence reports confirmed that the armed conflict is likely to be resolved in favor of the Sudanese army. Although these countries initially offered conditional and \u201cprice-paid\u201d support to the militias, they soon agreed on the necessity of maintaining a fallback position with Sudan after the war. Let\u2019s briefly shed light on the stance of these countries tasked with filing the complaint: Chad, Kenya, South Sudan, and Ethiopia:<\/p>

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Chad: President Mahamat Idriss De\u0301by is surrounded by precious opportunities, but his problem is that he often hesitates to take action. I don\u2019t know if he pauses to reflect, acknowledging their success, or hesitates due to fear of their consequences. Deby has directed his political and security compass westward toward the new Sahel region he seeks to engage with, yet he still waits for the delayed leap he wants to take to preserve a fallback position with Khartoum. The Sudanese army\u2019s progress on all fronts has been reassuring to N\u2019Djamena, and this is something Deby openly acknowledges, even if he doesn\u2019t speak it out loud. In light of Khartoum\u2019s commitment to developing its vision for regional security and moving west toward the Sahel, I believe this will help reopen Chad\u2019s request for a meeting with Sudanese leadership. In the future, N\u2019Djamena, through the Justice and Equality Movement, will work on forming a triangle of cooperation and integration that brings the Sudanese army and its supporting armed movements together to limit the role of the Rapid Support Forces in western Sudan, protecting against the possibility of their elements entering eastern Chad and creating a potential conflict that could threaten the \u201cZaghawa\u201d rule in Chad.<\/p>

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Kenya: The recent progress of the Sudanese army\u2019s military operations was enough to change international and regional game rules. Just as Nairobi recognizes it faces a real internal crisis, manifested by a growing opposition with political and social weight after the former vice president \u201cGachagua\u201d and ex-foreign minister \u201cKalonzo\u201d joined forces with former justice minister \u201cMartha,\u201d it also knows that these Kenyan figures have long cooperated and coordinated with Sudanese security, and Khartoum will not need much effort to revive this cooperation whenever it desires. Nairobi, along with N\u2019Djamena, is among the capitals most familiar with Sudan\u2019s security structure, both in peacetime and especially in wartime.<\/p>

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Ethiopia: The administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is aware that leaving the door slightly ajar in the face of the Sudanese crisis no longer serves any purpose, especially with the emergence of Ethiopian military elements fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces. Addis Ababa has realized that this could lead to undesirable consequences in Sudan\u2019s future, as it presents Ethiopia as a follower of those undermining Sudanese sovereignty in this critical moment of Sudan\u2019s modern history. With the Sudanese army advancing and the growing security ties between Sudan and Eritrea, Addis Ababa\u2019s desire to restore relations with Khartoum to pre-April 2023 levels will intensify.<\/p>

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South Sudan: It is well known that President Salva Kiir Mayardit\u2019s administration is aware of the collaboration of many Southerners with the Rapid Support Forces. The deaths of some Southerners in areas controlled by the Sudanese army could have been resolved diplomatically, especially since Sudan is at war, and civilian casualties are expected. However, politicizing the incident for a specific purpose and going further is something that must be discussed and analyzed. Many Southerners have been killed or captured since April 2023, and Juba\u2019s reaction only became apparent with the military operations in favor of the Sudanese army. In the future, Juba understands that the international community, closely monitoring the developments in Sudan, is not waiting for a complaint from Sudan\u2019s neighboring countries. The recent complaint from Juba has gone nowhere, and if Juba wishes to repeat the same complaint, it is free to do so. However, the progress of the Sudanese military operations may impose new realities in South Sudan, especially with Khartoum\u2019s ability to split the internal ranks of South Sudan\u2019s political leadership by moving opposition elements that no longer see a future for the state under the current regime. Khartoum will not need much effort in this area, given its past security experience with Southern factions. Therefore, Juba should stop making noise and focus on making the \u201cTomena\u201d negotiations with the opposition successful.<\/p>

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The ability of the Sudanese Armed Forces to continue making progress in military operations has been the driving force behind the international community\u2019s increasing conviction that Sudan\u2019s military institution can maintain popular support, reinforcing the concept of real national armies. This has increased the international community\u2019s willingness to push for a serious political settlement\u2014an idea that was once excluded from the international agenda in Sudan, even by Washington.<\/p>

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A scholarly contribution by the researcher is available at the following link:<\/strong><\/span><\/em><\/p>

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