- French President Emmanuel Macron is visiting the Horn of Africa from December 20 to 22, coinciding with a ministerial meeting of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, chaired by Djibouti. This meeting will confirm the integration of Ethiopian forces into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), set to commence operations in January. The international community, in unanimous consensus, has not supported the removal of Ethiopia’s presence in Somalia, especially after Mogadishu approved the participation of Egyptian forces in ATMIS. Major international players in the Horn of Africa are fully aware that Cairo’s attempts to curb Ethiopian influence in Africa—particularly in the Nile Basin—will not yield the desired results.
Cairo’s announcement of a military council for the ten Nile Basin states, aimed at supplying them with military equipment while reviving Egypt’s defense industry, will remain within the limits of coordination and mutual interests. Kampala’s approval of Egypt’s participation in the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in October does not undermine its intelligence and defense cooperation with Addis Ababa. Uganda and other upstream Nile countries share Ethiopia’s vision of regional development benefiting all basin states. Egyptian diplomacy is well aware of this, as well as the fact that the Nile Basin Initiative summit, postponed in October, is now scheduled for the first quarter of 2025. This summit will take place under exceptional circumstances, as six member states have already ratified cooperative management of the Nile waters—an approach opposed by Cairo. Despite Egypt’s promise to invest $100 million in the Nile Basin region (as stated by Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aty), the key question remains: Will Cairo be allowed to negotiate amendments to the Cooperative Framework Agreement? This issue is expected to be discussed between France and Ethiopia.
Macron’s visit to Ethiopia and Djibouti aligns with France’s broader strategic outlook, particularly regarding key Indian Ocean states such as Kenya and Tanzania, which are becoming central to Paris’ geopolitical strategy beyond its traditional spheres of influence. While France implicitly supports Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access, Turkey’s recent mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia has encouraged Paris to revive the Ethiopia-France defense cooperation agreement signed in 2019 (suspended due to Ethiopia’s political crisis). This agreement facilitated the training of Ethiopian naval personnel, benefiting around 300 individuals so far, with some receiving training in France.
In its bid to strengthen security ties with Ethiopia, France may invite Addis Ababa to the UN Ocean Conference on Maritime Security, scheduled for 2025 in Paris. France’s development agency, AFD, has also increased its engagement in Ethiopia, funding major infrastructure projects, including a fiber optic cable network benefiting six million people and over 2,500 healthcare centers. Paris has also played a role in Ethiopia’s cultural restoration, contributing €20 million to the renovation of the National Palace. According to French sources, Macron is expected to attend the 25th anniversary celebration of Emperor Haile Selassie.
Given France’s strategic interest in the Horn of Africa, Macron’s visit is likely to focus on the following key objectives:
- Supporting Djibouti’s proposal, introduced by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf in September, to jointly manage the Port of Tadjoura with Ethiopia.
- Negotiating a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia to restructure its $28 billion external debt. With the IMF currently in talks with Ethiopia, France seeks to reassess Ethiopia’s credit rating to resume lending. Paris aims to enhance its presence in Ethiopia by 2025 through additional energy and infrastructure investments. This aligns with the October meeting between Ethiopian Finance Minister Ahmed Shide and AFD Director Rémy Rioux.
- Backing Nairobi’s vision that regional economic integration will ease tensions in the Horn of Africa. This will push France to persuade Ethiopia to join the East African Community while strengthening security and intelligence cooperation with Ethiopia and Kenya. Paris and Nairobi have shared security cooperation since 2004, including training Kenyan officers at the French Joint Defense College. Over three decades, Kenyan forces have also benefited from the Defense Forces School of Education and Languages (DEFSEL) in Nairobi. Additionally, France’s National Maritime School (ENSM) is expected to collaborate with Kenya’s Bandari Maritime Academy as part of efforts to involve French companies in the expansion of Mombasa Port. Despite the presence of the French shipping giant CMA CGM in Kenya, Paris is keen on increasing French corporate involvement in this strategic project.
- Strengthening security and cyber intelligence collaboration, as evident in the diplomatic and military initiatives led by French Ambassador to Nairobi Arnaud Suquet, alongside Kenyan Intelligence Chief Mohamed Amin and former Defense Minister Aden Duale since May. France may also support the development of a private port in Lamu County to meet Ethiopia’s maritime access needs. Consequently, Paris is expected to back the construction of a 740-km road linking Isiolo, Wajir, and Mandera, a key component of the Horn of Africa’s regional economic integration strategy. This road will connect to the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET).
Macron’s visit will also include discussions on Sudan, likely in coordination with Washington.
- With the Sudanese Armed Forces making significant territorial gains—including seizing the headquarters of the Rapid Support Forces in southern Omdurman and nearing the liberation of Gezira State—there are expectations of a Turkish-backed initiative, possibly mediated by Ethiopia or Djibouti, to support international efforts in resolving Sudan’s crisis.
- France is also deploying Christian Kamara and Frédéric Tisserand, two key security figures with past intelligence ties in Sudan, to strengthen its foothold in post-Bashir Sudan. Their role in expanding Sofema, a French security consulting firm in Africa, aligns with France’s evolving Horn of Africa strategy. This is evidenced by the opening of a CCI France International branch in Addis Ababa, replacing the French-Ethiopian Business Club, with future plans to establish a presence in Sudan once conditions allow.
Since 2018, France and the US have shared a common perspective on Ethiopia. The historic reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, followed by armed conflicts involving Ethiopian factions like the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and regional players such as Eritrea, has placed Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed under sustained criticism. However, international stakeholders view this turmoil as a means of keeping Abiy preoccupied with domestic issues, preventing him from engaging in broader regional ambitions, such as establishing a mini-confederation in the Horn of Africa. While some actors benefit from Ethiopia’s internal instability, they paradoxically also prefer Abiy to remain in power but weakened—ensuring that he remains preoccupied with internal dissent rather than accelerating Ethiopia’s national development, particularly the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
Ethiopia’s political system is keen on preserving its federal model. International powers do not support ethnic secessionist movements, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), as they prefer Ethiopia to remain united under a strong central government. The global interest lies in transitioning Ethiopia’s political landscape towards a party-based system—similar to the US Democratic and Republican model—rather than an ethnicity-driven structure. However, Ethiopia’s deeply rooted ethnic politics present a challenge to this transformation. Ethnic identity remains a dominant force in African politics, often dictating governance, conflicts, and social dynamics—a legacy partly shaped by colonial strategies of empowering certain ethnic groups to maintain control over others.
Despite ongoing challenges, international powers continue to view Ethiopia as a rising force in the Horn of Africa. As a result, they will not allow Ethiopia to collapse. This understanding was shared by Egypt under Mubarak and Sudan under Bashir, and it remains relevant today. Both Cairo and Khartoum—regardless of future leadership changes—recognize Ethiopia’s critical role in global geopolitics. Thus, Egypt and Sudan will seek a genuine strategic balance with Ethiopia, which cannot be achieved without considering Eritrea. While Asmara has historically played a destabilizing role in the region, it will likely adopt a pragmatic approach, preserving at least a minimal level of good neighborly relations after decades of tension, conflicts, and support for armed movements.
Dr. Amina Al-Arimi
An Emirati researcher specializing in African affairs.
