Some African scholars recount that former Nigerien President Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, during a meeting with a French delegation, sought to temper the enthusiasm of that delegation as it spoke about the role of the French company Areva in extracting uranium from Nigerien soil and how such efforts would contribute to the country’s development. The President’s response was measured yet firm: “There are deep-rooted foundations within the African spirit—principles that, over time, have become immutable rules the world must comprehend if it wishes to halt anyone who dares to undermine African dignity.”
That presidential statement alone, delivered to the French delegation, was enough to convince Paris of the necessity of courting the prominent military leader at the time, Daouda Malam Wanké, and orchestrating the infamous assassination of President Maïnassara upon his return from pilgrimage—an incident still described by African media as “Baré, la mort ne meurt pas” (“Baré, death does not die”).
Following the assumption of power by Niger’s military council in July 2023, President General Abdourahmane Tiani’s administration appeared keen to consolidate domestic unity and reinforce the confidence of senior military figures in the ruling council and its prospective political role. General Tiani often reiterates that the Western media’s portrayal of Niger as “a state that speaks more of security than it practices” should never weaken the nation’s resolve. On the contrary, he insists it must fuel the country’s determination to eradicate terrorism — an alien phenomenon to Nigerien society in particular, and to African society in general.
To reaffirm this commitment, General Tiani recently conducted a tour of the Tillabéri Triangle, commonly referred to as the “Triangle of Death,” located at the border junction between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The area remains one of the most entrenched strongholds of terrorism in West Africa. His visit carried several clear messages:
🛑 The first message was directed inward, to the Nigerien populace. The administration sought to assert state authority while urging citizens to participate actively in supporting national security and strengthening what is referred to as “internal cohesion.” Such unity, if achieved, would directly contribute to the success of government initiatives aimed at establishing internal stability.
🛑 The second message had a dual dimension. The first part was addressed to Niger’s Sahel Alliance partners — Mali and Burkina Faso — emphasizing that confronting security challenges can only succeed through joint efforts and coordinated strategies. The second part was aimed at the international community, underscoring that the Nigerien state remains fully aware of the on-ground realities, even in the most perilous regions, and that it will not deviate from its course of asserting authority across the nation. The message was clear: Niger’s armed forces possess the capacity to reach and operate in those very zones.
Despite the ruling military council’s efforts to strengthen relations with neighboring countries and to promote what has come to be known as the Continental Security Strategy—a concept first introduced by the Republic of Rwanda and implemented in several African states such as Mozambique, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan—the new Sahel states appear to be developing a more advanced and potentially more effective vision, should they overcome their current challenges.
However, many Nigerien citizens believe that their government’s plans remain largely rhetorical and symbolic, lacking tangible operational change on the ground. Since the coup of July 2023, no region in western Niger has witnessed sustainable improvement. Instead, terrorist attacks have intensified, displacing thousands of civilians. Even the trilateral alliance between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger lacks an active joint operations room or a structured intelligence-sharing mechanism. This absence will inevitably compel the Sahel states to transform their alliance into a genuine strategic instrument if they wish to ensure its success and longevity.
Public opinion within Niger remains divided over President Tiani’s visit to the Tillabéri region. While some viewed the tour as a symbolic affirmation of leadership, others criticized it for lacking concrete outcomes—no announcement of a new operational plan, no defined anti-terrorism partnership, no security restructuring, nor even the establishment of joint field command centers. Such shortcomings suggest, and indeed confirm, that Niger’s military leadership continues to act reactively rather than proactively. The absence of a strategic coordination mechanism linking security and development remains one of the key reasons behind the country’s persistent difficulties, as the boundaries between the army, police, and national guard authorities often blur.
Undoubtedly, combating terrorism requires vast resources—funding, training, intelligence, transportation, infrastructure, and logistical support—elements that are almost entirely deficient in Niger. The government recognizes these shortcomings and strives to address them, yet Niamey remains aware that the path toward genuine national security is still long and arduous. Beyond the material constraints, political complexities further complicate the security landscape, as security imperatives often intersect with local and tribal considerations, not to mention the influence of international actors who view Niger alternately as an opportunity to eliminate adversaries or to reverse the post-2023 order. Some even frame the situation through the lens of what the French press has called “Le coup d’État des tribus africaines contre la composante arabe au Niger”—“The coup of African tribes against the Arab component in Niger.”
On the other hand, it is essential to analyze the Nigerien state from within. Niger faces an array of challenges stemming from escalating terrorist activities and weak coordination among its various security institutions, which undermines its capacity to anticipate attacks. Moreover, the Nigerien military suffers from chronic difficulties in acquiring weapons and logistical supplies. Francophone African media outlets have repeatedly highlighted these constraints, noting that some defense companies have grown hesitant to engage with what they describe as an “illegitimate” or “coup-born” regime. Although Niamey has consistently rejected such claims and emphasized the strength of its domestic front and security apparatus, developments in June of this year validated portions of those reports. Evidence surfaced of a secret security delegation that traveled from Niamey to Nairobi to negotiate an arms deal with the Kenyan government. The arrangement was facilitated by Chalbi Industries, a company licensed since the era of former President Uhuru Kenyatta to manufacture low-cost weapons, supplemented by imports. The deal sparked controversy when the shipment was found to include Iranian-manufactured AK-47 assault rifles. Although the Kenyan company insisted that it does not engage with any state under international sanctions, multiple security sources disputed that claim, noting the company’s refusal to provide certificates of origin for its military exports.
Nevertheless, some analysts argue that Niger has succeeded, at least partially, in reinforcing the continuity of its national foreign policy trajectory. Following the visit of former Beninese presidents Nicéphore Soglo and Thomas Boni Yayi to Niamey—an effort to de-escalate tensions between General Tiani’s military council and Benin’s President Patrice Talon in July of last year—Niger began reassessing, or rather, redesigning its foreign policy posture toward regional neighbors, particularly those whose interests in Niger were closely tied to the former President Mohamed Bazoum.
There are also signs that Niamey is increasingly relying on external partners—both states and international organizations. Within the European Union, member states may differ in their approaches toward the new Sahel bloc, and toward Niger in particular, yet they converge on one point: Niger represents a key transit hub for irregular migration to Europe. The EU recognizes that President Tiani’s administration is acutely aware of the pragmatic posture now adopted by several European countries seeking to maintain a foothold in Niger while tactically limiting Russia’s growing presence in the region. This explains Berlin’s decision in January 2025 to resume its development assistance to Niger—frozen since the July 2023 coup—based on the EU’s belief that pragmatic engagement can be achieved through close cooperation with local authorities and non-governmental organizations on development issues, while keeping a measured distance from the military leadership. This cautious engagement strategy has been described by Francophone African observers as “approche prudente”—a “cautious approach.”
Two significant developments merit attention here, as they help to dispel the negative image that Western media have recently imposed upon Niamey, while simultaneously demonstrating its determination to assert a nationally grounded strategic direction, particularly regarding its vital resources:
🛑 The first development, concerns the strategy adopted by the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP)—specifically the Nigerien National Nuclear Energy Commission—in its dealings with Nicolas Maes, CEO of the French company Orano, which has operated in Niger since 1970. Niamey’s insistence on opening the door to non-French international partners in its mining sector underscores President Tiani’s commitment to diversifying strategic partnerships and avoiding the fragmentation long attributed to Niger’s extractive policies by sections of the French press.
🛑 The second development, which complements the first, is President Tiani’s decision to engage Nigerien researchers and intellectuals such as Moustapha Hassan, head of Aghirin’man, one of Niger’s most active organizations in raising awareness about the social, economic, and environmental consequences of uranium mining. Hassan has been among the most vocal critics of French mining conglomerates operating across West Africa. This move, unsurprisingly, prompted Paris to accelerate the expansion of its mining investments in Asia, amid growing speculation that France may soon lose its longstanding uranium presence in Niger.
Within the broader vision of the New Sahel Alliance—which regards continental cooperation as an existential necessity imposed by Africa’s rapidly evolving dynamics—Niger is likely to seek future collaboration with former Senegalese Prime Minister Amadou Ba, who has been working to serve the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) states, especially the new Sahel members (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), through his private financial consultancy. His previous tenure as Senegal’s Minister of Finance (2013–2019) provided him with close ties to international donors and financial institutions, including Christine Lagarde, then President of the European Central Bank, and Rémy Rioux, head of the French Development Agency (AFD). Ba also famously collaborated with major private banking institutions such as Rothschild, Lazard, and JP Morgan in efforts to restructure African sovereign debts—an experience that could prove invaluable for Niger’s economic and strategic repositioning within the evolving Sahel order.
Dr. Ameena Alarimi
Emirati researcher specializing in African affairs
