The negotiations between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under American sponsorship and supervision, are not detached from the recent drone attacks targeting Khartoum airport and several Sudanese cities. They are also closely linked to the recent televised threat by the RSF leader, Hemeti, targeting airports within and outside Sudan. It appears that these negotiations aim to place the Sudanese negotiating delegation — representing the leadership of the national Sudanese state — in a framework of instability, presented persuasively to suggest that the “drone war” has not yet begun, even as the RSF continues to be armed.
This type of strategic maneuver, referred to by international intelligence agencies as “The persuasion of onlookers” (originally La persuasion des passants), has become a prominent feature even in research debates on political security. It describes officials who frequently change positions while maintaining a persuasive discourse, causing people to believe them despite their inconsistencies — a deliberate tactic employed by hostile security agencies to undermine public trust in state leadership.
Furthermore, the selection of Washington as the venue for the negotiations carries its own strategic and intelligence significance. The U.S. administration appears to view it as a tangible reality aligned with its strategic vision for the future of the East African region, particularly given the recent deployment of U.S. intelligence personnel to Port Sudan. Additionally, this choice has psychological implications, affecting the general mindset of the primary negotiators — the Sudanese state delegation and the RSF delegation — who might not fully grasp the practical significance and depth of these complex dimensions if the same negotiations had been held in the capitals of the Quad countries involved.
These negotiations also seem intended to send a direct message to the leadership of the Sudanese state: there is no way to halt the political and military gains achieved by the Sudanese military following the liberation of the city of Bara, except by forcing it to negotiate. This implies thwarting all attempts to exclude the RSF from the Sudanese political scene, even if it constitutes a direct challenge to the will of the Sudanese people.
Consequently, the Sudanese state, in parallel with the international pressures directed at it, must implement the following measures:
•🔆 Continue the nationwide mobilization operations already initiated, which succeeded in reclaiming control of the state and its vital facilities, while simultaneously defeating the multinational RSF.
•🔆 Develop programs within the morale and guidance directorates of all military and security institutions, introducing specific moral guidance programs suited to the civilian component and applicable in schools and universities to preserve and reinforce the domestic national front.
•🔆 Expand demining operations and deploy them across all Sudanese cities and states to eliminate all threats to citizen safety (including entering into cooperation with Ankara for this purpose).
•🔆 Intensify military operations and expand the liberated areas, particularly with the return of displaced persons to their states of origin.
It must be stated clearly: the negotiations led by Washington between the Sudanese army and the RSF are unlikely to fulfill the expectations of the Sudanese public. Even if successful, they will likely be limited to opening secure corridors for humanitarian aid to the El-Fasher region, and will not go beyond that.
The partition plan, which has lingered in Western strategic imagination since 1922 — beginning with the policy of closed areas — evolved into a comprehensive strategic project after 1983 during the Second Civil War, and found practical application in 2011 with the secession of the South. Today, it continues in attempts to dismantle what remains of the Sudanese state through civil war and internal military and political conflict.
As for the discussion of reviving the “Jeddah Forum,” Riyadh recognizes that the U.S.-sponsored forum was never intended to resolve the Sudanese crisis, but to prolong it, keeping the conflict between the “Sudanese National Army” and the “RSF” in a point of no return, paving the way for what some African elites describe as: “Sudan is not like its people.”
Dr.Ameena Alarimi
Emirati researcher in African affairs
