Even the most seasoned African military academies—those well-versed in the political and security arenas—recognize that the challenge imposed on the Sudanese Armed Forces from within, with clear regional and international coordination, aimed at dismantling the national state structure, stripping it of legitimacy, and eroding its institutions. Yet, paradoxically, this same challenge has unintentionally contributed to the emergence of the Sudanese military institution as a regional and international force, in a way unprecedented in modern African history.
This is a significant indicator—one that speaks volumes to those who understand the deep consciousness of peoples when it is tied to a homeland rather than to a ruler.
A striking example of this was the comment by Brigadier Adebayo Adekola, the head of Nigeria’s intelligence service, when one of his aides asked:
“Sir, we’ve exerted tremendous efforts to dismantle terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin. What haven’t we done yet that it still persists?”
Adebayo replied: “Destiny chooses its pivotal stations carefully, and it settles among nations whom God has prepared to lead. And destiny does not err.”
As the final chapters of the Battle of Khartoum began to unfold, several files emerged before me—files that I consider essential to address and deconstruct, as they are intimately tied to the outcomes of the Khartoum battle.
The progression or delay of these files hinges on one decisive factor: the trajectory of military operations and what they may reveal in the coming days.
File One: The Parallel Peace Government – A Retreat Signaling Decline
🔆 There is no doubt that the Battle of Khartoum cast a heavy shadow over the political blueprint envisioned for the parallel peace government, which was set to be announced this April.
The Sudanese Armed Forces’ success in expelling the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from all government buildings and sovereign ministries, and in reclaiming the national capital, has disrupted all the groundwork the militia had laid for launching its parallel government.
I am convinced that their disbandment and retreat from this plan is only a matter of time. We may soon witness pleas for amnesty directed at the Sudanese government, similar to those issued by political and military figures who previously defected from the RSF and returned to the national fold.
If the African press described the founding charter announced in Nairobi as a “shallow pact,” the Battle of Khartoum came to solidify that label, translating it into a tangible reality—perhaps even convincing those regimes supporting the fall of national states of the enduring strength of national armies that operate beyond foreign supervision and external management.
🔆 All political, party, military, security, and intelligence elements recognize that defecting from the RSF and returning to the national fold—while it may not erase the lingering suspicion harbored by Sudanese leadership—might afford them a chance to reintroduce themselves.
They can attempt to regain some measure of public support, which is the first foundation for political re-entry. This stems from their long-term vision of post-war Sudan. These individuals believe that the Sudanese crisis and its pivotal developments have birthed a new Sudan, with a new people who carry little from the “Ingaz” era except its memory.
While some may long for aspects of that period, they clearly do not seek its return, owing to the evolution of the concept of nationhood in the Sudanese psyche—giving rise to forward-looking visions that could only have been born out of the painful convulsions witnessed in the land of the confluence.
🔆 The military and security bloc within the RSF, which was expected to form the core of the parallel peace government’s armed forces, realizes that its strategic bet has collapsed in the face of the battle for dignity waged against the Sudanese Armed Forces.
There is no defeat more crushing in the military lexicon than that of a force lavishly supplied and backed in a way unprecedented in modern African history, yet it crumbled on a battlefield it never truly owned—for it soon learned that the strength of the opponent was not in its weapons, but in its doctrine.
And so it withdrew, haunted by a feeling whose bitterness only the vanquished can fully comprehend—how can one hope to build the army of a state, when their own force could not hold ground?
File Two: Strategic Planning and Policy Rationalization
🔆 Prior to 2019, France attempted to enhance its presence in Khartoum through the French Center for Social, Economic, and Legal Studies. Due to the war, however, the French Armed Forces requested the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) to cooperate with the French Institute in Africa, located in Nairobi, to continue its research on Sudan.
What’s new is the involvement of Elie Tenenbaum, known for his strategy of “Militarized Grey Zones” (Zones Grises Militarisées), which asserts that in countries where multiple power centers exist, intelligence operations should shift from indirect to direct engagement.
To counter and contain this approach, I believe Khartoum—working through the Sudanese Ministry of Culture—should take the following actions:
♦ Develop specialized research centers focused on strategic planning and policy guidance, which have previously helped Sudan avoid politically engineered traps and played a key role in overcoming crises imposed from abroad.
A notable example is the “Ijjaz Mansour” file, which the U.S. administration tried to manipulate against the former regime during the 1990s. The crisis was resolved based on a strategic plan developed by one of Sudan’s decision-support think tanks.
At the time, Washington acknowledged the resolution, with National Review magazine headlining its cover with “Lesson Learned”, in reference to Qutbi Al-Mahdi, the official in charge of the case.
♦ Reopen the Rasid Center for Political and Strategic Studies and enhance its operational mechanisms to restore its important role in advancing scientific research and strategic policymaking.
It is suggested that Professor Madawi Al-Turabi be entrusted with the task. Known by some West African political elites as “La Source du Savoir” (The Source of Knowledge), Al-Turabi enjoys wide academic respect for his efforts in bridging the Sudanese image in African and Arab circles, backed by his charismatic persona.
♦ Prepare a dedicated program to receive top commanders from the Senegalese Armed Forces, whose visit to Khartoum was arranged following President Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan’s recent visit to Dakar.
This comes as President Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s administration intensifies pressure on the Senegalese military to develop a new defense doctrine, especially considering the scheduled complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Senegal by year-end.
Before meeting the Senegalese delegation, Sudanese leadership should closely review two key files:
▪ First: The outcomes of the meeting between General Koly Faye, Senegal’s head of military intelligence, and senior British military officers at the UK Defence Academy, particularly their discussions on the Sudanese file.
▪ Second: The state of Senegal’s Air Force.
Despite owning CN-235 reconnaissance aircraft, their poor condition and the Senegalese government’s inability to procure replacements until at least 2027 due to budget constraints limit their search-and-rescue capabilities.
Khartoum can play the role of mediator between Ankara and Dakar, especially after the collapse of talks, which Dakar perceived as Turkish rejection of its demands.
An ideal opportunity to address this would be during the upcoming Turkish delegation’s visit to Sudan, during which Ankara plans to present an offer via Aksa Enerji, a company owned by Ali Kazancı, one of Turkey’s most active businessmen in Africa.
♦ With Sudanese-Russian relations on the rise, the Ukrainian company H3Operations has started maneuvering to establish a presence in Khartoum.
Sources indicate this initiative came at the urging of American and French actors, aiming to closely study Sudan’s Air Force, which played a key role in shifting the balance in the Battle of Khartoum.
Before considering H3’s proposal, Sudan is advised to formulate a roadmap for managing its future interests with all parties—supporting a strategy of diversified partnerships.
H3Operations previously provided logistical support to French operations in Chad, transporting personnel and heavy helicopters.
It owns a fleet of Mi-8/17 helicopters, and had deployed two aircraft and a 12-member team of pilots and mechanics to the French airbase in N’Djamena.
After the French military withdrawal, the aircraft and team were relocated to Juba, where they now support UN operations in South Sudan.
H3’s contracts are now managed under U.S. AFRICOM, which sees a potential return of H3 teams to N’Djamena to fill the airpower gap in Chad.
♦ Selection of a Sudanese Team of Recent Graduates to Join the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Network for the Horn of Africa, led by Fathi Basha, the Youth Ambassador for the Horn of Africa, who has shown interest in discussing the Sudanese crisis.
The goal is to enhance Khartoum’s role regionally in East African societies, as it is both highly influential and affected by internal Sudanese dynamics. Additionally, this involvement will enable Sudanese youth to engage more actively in African regional organizations tied to international institutions, offering them an opportunity to better understand their policies from within. This will also allow Sudanese youth to contribute to shaping the future policies of these organizations, especially in light of the ongoing political and security developments in Africa.
♦ Sudan’s Participation in the African Union-European Union Foreign Ministers Summit in Brussels next June.
This summit is critical as it precedes the Heads of State meeting, and it coincides with the African Union and European Union’s agreement to form a new commission merging the two unions. The details of this agreement will be announced later this year. The European Union has viewed the closure of the U.S. Agency for International Development as an opportunity to strengthen its presence in Africa, especially with African nations seeking European funding for projects that the U.S. previously supported. Sudan’s participation in this event will open up new avenues for diversifying partnerships and attracting investments.
♦ Recognition of a New Power Balance in the Horn of Africa by Sudan’s Neighboring Countries.
The regional neighbors of Sudan recognize that a new “balance of power” is taking shape in East Africa, and it is in their best interest to cooperate and coordinate with it for the benefit of national interests. The success of the Sudanese Armed Forces in managing this multi-national, multi-faceted war has significant strategic, security, and political implications for all neighboring countries, which are well aware of the vulnerability of their own institutions should they face similar challenges. This situation has empowered Sudan’s security institutions, making them the primary and sole authority capable of enforcing national consensus.
To enhance this, it is proposed to establish a regional tactical training center in Khartoum, which would include Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region countries.
The center’s mission would be to exchange security and military expertise across various fields, develop practical mechanisms to strengthen the security environment for all member states, create strategies for combating terrorism and armed groups undermining national sovereignty, and organize lectures and workshops for researchers and specialists in security and political affairs.
Sudanese Platform: Urgent Files That Need to Be Studied
🔆 Central African Republic:
The administration of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra understands that its efforts to tame the opposition and weaken its role will not succeed without Sudan’s involvement. Khartoum sees that Bangui does not always maintain neutrality between the Sudanese government and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This understanding has led the Sudanese leadership to keep the door slightly ajar for the Central African Republic (CAR), signaling Khartoum’s commitment to finding mutually agreeable solutions that assure Bangui’s security without compromising Khartoum’s own security. It seems that both parties are heading toward an imminent meeting that may shape the future of their relations. The Central African Republic is preparing for a secret session after Ramadan with Mohamed Khatem and Abaker Saboun, leaders of the National Coalition for Change (CPC), who arrived in Bangui in early March after being detained in Chad for 11 months. This is part of Bangui’s efforts to contain the opposition. However, the most critical element remains Armel Sayou, a former colonel in the armed forces and the head of the Military Alliance for the Salvation of the People. To influence Armel’s power, Bangui has enlisted the help of Russia’s Wagner Group (formerly known as Wagner) to dismantle the BIT-7 battalion of the Central African Armed Forces due to their loyalty to Armel.
♦ Analysis of Sudan’s Role:
What is happening in the Central African Republic is seen as strengthening Sudan’s security and intelligence role in the Central African region. Therefore, the following steps are proposed for Khartoum:
- Retain the leverage of Armel Sayou due to his extensive influence in the security, political, and social circles of the Central African Republic. This is due to his family ties to former president André Kolingba and his proximity to important political figures both inside and outside Bangui. Sudan can easily achieve this due to Armel’s long-standing and positive relationship with the Sudanese military, which dates back to his time as the head of security during President Kolingba’s regime, through his pivotal role in facilitating the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 2019, and culminating in his recent stance supporting Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity amidst its internal crisis.
- Additionally, Armel Sayou holds French citizenship, which has allowed him to integrate into various French academic, political, and media circles, potentially allowing Khartoum to gain political and media momentum in supporting its causes.
(Note: Some sources indicate that Armel was arrested in Yaoundé, based on an arrest warrant issued by Bangui.)
♦ Khartoum’s Leverage on “Armel” and Its Relations with Armed Opposition Factions in the Central African Republic
While Khartoum’s influence over the various factions of the Central African Republic’s armed opposition coalition may concern President Touadéra’s administration, it remains the ultimate guarantee for Khartoum regarding Bangui’s commitment to Sudan. Bangui must understand that Khartoum will not heavily rely on promises to cut off supply routes to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). With the RSF’s attempts to form its parallel government, what ensures that Touadéra will not recognize this government? Especially since non-recognition does not rule out coordination and engagement, and there’s also the potential for Bangui to face external pressures that could lead it to shift its position. Therefore, Khartoum has the right to chart its regional course following this bitter experience with militia forces undermining the sovereignty of national states.
🔆 Federal Republic of Somalia:
Due to the multiple routes used to deliver military supplies to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Puntland in Somalia has emerged as one of the key destinations for these supplies. In coordination with neighboring regional countries, Sudan’s leadership is advised to closely monitor the security ebb and flow between Ethiopia and Somalia. If Sudan succeeds in managing these fluctuations, it could then move towards drying up the RSF’s military supply sources. Therefore, Sudan must be informed about the “Leo Police” — a paramilitary group from Somali Region in Ethiopia, established through coordination between Abdi Mohamud Omar, former president of the Somali Region of Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Security Service to eliminate the activities of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). With the deterioration of Ethiopian-Somali relations, some of the Leo Police joined the administration of Jubaland in Somalia, followed by members of the ONLF, despite signing a peace agreement with Ethiopia in 2018. According to their statements, they found no tangible benefits from the agreement and thus moved to Jubaland to fight against Al-Shabaab for monetary compensation. This explains the appointment of Colonel Khaled Sheikh Omar as the commander of Somali Army Infantry in November 2024, due to his previous role as the head of Jubaland Intelligence and his membership in the Leo Police. This has prompted Addis Ababa to relocate Ethiopian defense forces from northern Harar to the eastern command of Gode. The goal of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration is to demonstrate its ability to protect its borders against threats, including the deployment of Egyptian forces as part of the African Union Mission to Support Somalia (AUSSOM). The ongoing situation along the Ethiopian-Somali border facilitates the smuggling of weapons in and out of the region.
🔆 Republic of South Sudan:
The successive changes in South Sudan increasingly confirm the depth of the internal crisis and the fragmentation of the security environment in Juba. If this continues, it will negatively affect Sudan’s national security. The crisis in President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s administration is no longer just with his deputy and historical rival, Riek Machar, but has expanded to include many of the president’s allies, who have been dismissed and placed under house arrest. This has been seen by the international community as a blow to the historic struggle South Sudan led against the north. As a result, relations have deteriorated between the leadership of the National Army, the People’s Defence Forces of South Sudan, their intelligence services, the National Security agency, the police under the Ministry of the Interior, and the Tiger Division. This means that all the military and security arms, which were supposed to work in an integrated manner to protect the state’s security, will find themselves at a crossroads, tempting them to adopt an opposing stance, even at the expense of the nation.
♦ Khartoum realizes that the most dangerous decision made by President Kiir’s administration, which could turn things upside down in South Sudan, was the decision to demote Santino Deng Wol, the chief of staff since 2011, to a lower position in the Ministry of Defence. This was followed by Paul Malong Awan moving to the opposition and forming a group called the “United Front of South Sudan”. For those who don’t know, Paul Malong is the former head of the South Sudanese army and one of the president’s closest military figures. His famous quote, “If you want me to have a problem, that problem should be in Juba,” underscores the significance of the presidential decision to remove him from the political and security scene in South Sudan.
♦ Despite the growing internal tensions in Juba, which warn of an imminent armed confrontation between the president’s camp and opposition factions, I believe Paul Malong will not join Riek Machar’s camp due to his pivotal role in founding the “Sauver le Président” militia, which was created from the Dinka tribe to exterminate the Nuer tribe to which Machar belongs.
♦ It is suggested that Khartoum form a crisis cell to monitor the situation in South Sudan and maintain a neutral stance toward all parties with a clear diplomatic line. However, it must be noted that some pockets of the Rapid Support Forces militia, stationed in the border regions with South Sudan, may exploit the worsening situation in Juba and export it into Sudanese territory. This is expected to disrupt the military operations being carried out by the Sudanese Army in El Fasher. Therefore, Sudan must diversify and intensify the work of its armed units in Darfur to assert the state’s authority throughout the region. Militia strongholds in western Sudan will not be able to withstand for long and will not form an insurmountable barrier against the state and its institutions if they assert themselves. This is a historical opportunity for the Sudanese Armed Forces to eliminate the partition project from its roots.
♦ There are two key issues that the Sudanese leadership should beware of, especially as Sudanese military operations steadily advance beyond El Fasher:
▪ First: The Rapid Support Forces may seek the assistance of a group of Syrian officers who arrived in Benghazi after the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. I don’t believe Khartoum was unaware of the “Syrian Reports from Africa” in 2020, which confirmed cooperation between Assad and Khalifa Haftar, leading to a secret agreement to train Libyan national army pilots in Syria, in addition to the air bridge between Damascus and Benghazi for the transport of mercenaries and smuggling between eastern Libya and Syria.
▪ Second: Libyan militias, particularly the “Sabbouh al-Salam” militia operating in southeast Libya and aligned with the Rapid Support Forces, are planning to establish a new “military” entity on the Sudanese-Chadian-Egyptian borders. This entity aims to develop strategies for potential confrontations with the Sudanese army on one hand and enhance supply lines for the Rapid Support Forces on the other, as they control a significant number of routes used by migrants and outlawed groups.
I believe Khartoum has a historic opportunity to reassert itself regionally with a new strategy that aligns with its current political stature. The success of its armed forces in maintaining the functioning of national institutions in collaboration with the international community, as the sole legitimate representative of Sudan, and pushing back the multinational Rapid Support Forces from key locations, provides the foundation for this strategic shift.
Dr. Amina Al-Arimi
An Emirati researcher specializing in African affairs.
