A colleague in academic research recounted that, after the city of Al-Fashir fell into the hands of the multinational Rapid Support Forces (RSF), he coincidentally found himself with a senior French security official “residing in Africa.” According to his account, the official said verbatim:
“If there were any extended future for the emergence of cross-border militias, the fall of Al-Fashir has ended it. There are political and security considerations that will soon become clear, and their full scope is beyond the comprehension of the employed ‘hired’ militias.”
The U.S. administration’s perception of Sudanese state leadership changed after the fall of Al-Fashir to the RSF. Washington’s mission in post-Al-Fashir Sudan is no longer the same as before. Previously, the U.S. had relied on “la persuasion des passants”—a deliberate behavioral tactic used by foreign intelligence agencies to undermine citizens’ confidence in their government. Today, the situation is fundamentally different.
Although the fall of Al-Fashir could not have occurred without American approval—the ultimate decision-making authority—the tragic events that followed initially received little attention from Washington. Nevertheless, these events significantly disrupted prior security and political calculations coordinated with all parties supporting the RSF, whether they were states, militias, intelligence agencies, or international organizations. French research circles have labeled this network “l’État satellite”, a term that emerged after World War II to describe states functioning as operational extensions within a dominant global system.
Observers of U.S. diplomatic activity after Al-Fashir note that it increasingly relies on what security experts call “audace composée”, an intelligence-driven maneuver resembling a 20th-century strategy that has resurfaced under the label “hybrid strategy”. Modern military science classifies this as a strategy specific to major powers, given their control over global and regional events. This strategy is expected to guide U.S. policy in postwar Sudan. Importantly, this approach is not confined to President Donald Trump’s administration but will extend beyond it, regardless of whether a Republican or Democratic government assumes office. Those seeking to understand U.S. strategic vision in Africa should carefully study the secret April 2024 discussions between the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Niger’s military council regarding the delivery of large quantities of uranium, followed by security skirmishes and political clashes, culminating in Raisi’s disappearance from the scene by the end of May.
Washington is now convinced that the horrific events in Al-Fashir following its fall to the RSF have significantly strengthened the project to remove the militia from Sudanese political life. This conviction is rooted not only in the experiences of the Sudanese population, who have endured the RSF’s violence, but also in the mindset of the Sudanese leadership, which increasingly perceives the militia’s exclusion as a national project. In this project, popular initiatives are intended to complement institutional efforts to eliminate the most significant threat to Sudan’s national security. Furthermore, the militia’s continued existence threatens the credibility of Sudanese institutions and international human rights organizations, whose reputations are still fragile after crises such as Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s.
The tragic nature of the Al-Fashir events and the surge of international condemnation have caused the international community to temporarily set aside its habitual selectivity in addressing human rights issues. The phrase “the echo of Al-Fashir surpasses Yelwa”—referring to the Nigerian city of Yelwa, which suffered one of the deadliest massacres in 2025—has begun circulating even within U.S. security circles.
Following the Sudanese government’s recent decision to declare general mobilization and continue military operations to liberate all national territory and suppress the rebellion, the U.S. has recognized that certain international actors, whose long-term vision for Sudan emerged after April 15, 2023, will begin activating their roles through regional axes. This development provides Khartoum with greater opportunities on the ground. Although Sudanese leadership is aware of the contradictions among these axes, it has become more conscious of its future role in the country and should work on finding common ground with all international actors managing these axes. This also allows space for emerging alignments recently described as “Les axes de rotation”, which in some cases align with Sudan’s positions and in others diverge, but generally present a more positive political approach, respecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The American approach in Sudan is expected to follow several detailed paths:
- Intellectual-Military Strategy: This involves la réorientation conceptuelle des moyens—the conceptual reorientation of resources and methods—to ensure the achievement of a long-term vision for a “new Horn of Africa via Khartoum” while preventing Russian and Chinese influence from expanding in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. It also ensures that developments proceed under U.S. guidance, particularly given the ongoing coordination of “security” and “intelligence” efforts between Sudan and its regional and international allies.
- Reinforcement of EU-U.S. Operational Coordination: To counter Russian expansion along Africa’s eastern coasts, there is the potential revival of the EUUSSA project, initially proposed in 2015, aimed at establishing joint operational bases between the U.S. and the European Union in Africa to secure eastern maritime zones. This initiative extends the SHADE platform, an international coordination mechanism established in 2008, and explains the recent deployment of American military intelligence officers to Port Sudan.
- RSF Influence Management: Given the RSF’s association with Al-Fashir, and the global media’s depiction—since mid-2023—that Sudanese army-controlled cities are more stable and conducive to civilian life, the U.S. may support partial international and regional consensus to classify the RSF as a “terrorist group” or temporarily remove its leader, Hemedti, from the political scene. Simultaneously, a more acceptable alternative may be prepared to ensure regional support for the RSF-backed government (Tasis).
- Differentiation Among Militias: The foundations of the RSF differ from other militias in the region, such as Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya. Consequently, international security and political responses vary, reflecting differences in organizational structure, historical context, and operational methods. This approach underpins the future U.S. intelligence concept of Le saut organisé, a structured allocation of roles according to American vision for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa.
- Mitigation of Global Media Impact: Efforts will be made to reduce the international media impact of Al-Fashir events and to calm global public opinion, particularly those supporting Sudanese popular unrest. The goal is to manage perceptions and maintain stability by using a domestically acceptable Sudanese actor who is also trusted by Washington.
- Eritrean Dynamics: The political and security transformations anticipated in Eritrea will affect all security institutions. The U.S. is aware that Eritrea’s need to engage in conflicts to assert influence in the Horn of Africa limits its presence in international interventions compared to regional counterparts. The rise of armed Afar groups aiming to remove Afwerki from power further motivates Washington to strengthen engagement in Eritrea and encourage Khartoum to maintain cooperation to prevent Eritrea from joining regional efforts aimed at toppling the Sudanese state.
Given the complex political and military landscape in Sudan, several scenarios are anticipated for the U.S. approach and regional developments:
Scenario One: Supporting the Progress of Both Military Parties (Sudanese Army and RSF)
This scenario does not aim to empower the RSF to rule Sudan outright but rather to maintain it as a pressure card to control the trajectory of the Sudanese government. Under this scenario, all multinational actors supporting the RSF would be required to:
- Intensify the arming of the militia.
- Enable the RSF to maintain control over certain regions under Sudanese state authority.
- Simultaneously, destabilize northern states through targeted operations to pressure the Sudanese government into accepting the militia’s continued political presence.
Should this scenario unfold, it would set the stage for preparing a civilian government under Abdullah Hamdok. In this case, civilian elements currently part of Tasis would merge with the new civilian entity led by Hamdok. Over time, the Sudanese military would be gradually transformed into a symbolic institution, while RSF leaders would replace national military commanders responsible for matters of national security and military intelligence.
Scenario Two: Acceptance of the Recent Demands of the Sudanese Security and Defense Council
In this scenario, the U.S. recognizes that maintaining the Sudanese Army as a “regular national force” is a critical element for stabilizing the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and the Red Sea region. This aligns with Washington’s strategic goal of strengthening its influence in the area, which also explains its recent rapprochement with Somalia.
The political flexibility and security balance demonstrated by the current Sudanese leadership have convinced the international community that Sudan is capable of internal reform and of engaging constructively with global changes. This approach contrasts sharply with the period of Bashir’s rule, during which Washington was skeptical about Sudan’s adaptability.
Under this scenario, Sudan could gradually play its regional role without external interference in its internal affairs. The transformation is intended to be gradual and internally driven, while Washington focuses on securing its strategic interests and ensuring stability on fronts related to its African presence. Recent reports of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s attempts to engage Afar groups to gain access to the Red Sea, as well as rising international pressure to stop massacres against Christian communities in Nigeria, highlight the need for collaboration with national military institutions to manage regional security and limit militia-induced chaos.
Scenario Three: Application of a “Dismantle–Replace–Redirect” Strategy
This strategy involves the systematic takeover of national armies—a method applied by U.S. intelligence on the Iraqi army and associated security institutions after 2003. The objective is to restructure the army into a force capable of:
- Protecting local security and public order.
- Conducting border security and related operations.
In Sudan, this scenario would only be implemented in preparation for a full-scale military confrontation between the Sudanese Army and the RSF, with substantial external support from foreign military and security elements. Its success depends entirely on explicit American approval. In this case, the Sudanese army would face a direct restructuring, with the RSF and its external backers assuming significant operational control.
This approach is the most extreme and contingent on the failure of other strategies, as it would result in a fundamental reconfiguration of Sudanese national security institutions and political authority, effectively subordinating the state to external oversight under the guise of security stabilization.
Dr. Amina Al-araimi
Emirati researcher specializing in African affairs
