The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries share the view that Washington is fully aware of the political and security implications of the growing Iranian presence in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Should this presence escalate, Washington is considered the most capable party of understanding the potential outcomes and addressing or mitigating them. Consequently, the Gulf question arises: “Was the lack of seriousness in the U.S. diplomatic initiative to halt the war in Sudan part of an American strategy aimed at altering the rules of the game in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, potentially encouraging Khartoum to turn toward Tehran, thus giving Iran an opportunity to strengthen its regional presence, effectively maintaining the possibility of a military confrontation between Iran and Gulf states as a ‘pressure card,’ especially if Sino-Russian-Gulf rapprochement progresses at the expense of Washington?” This question is particularly relevant in the context of declining Gulf confidence in their traditional ally, following the Israeli attack on Doha, and the emerging Gulf hypothesis concerning the “fragility of national secrecy and the increasing ability of certain actors to access decision-making centers and sensitive information, with the potential to strike domestically.”
From an African perspective, the divergent political views among Gulf states regarding the situation in Sudan partially explain the U.S. administration’s historically slow diplomatic engagement in the Sudanese file. The recent “active” U.S. diplomatic movement was not motivated by a genuine commitment to end the war, but rather aimed to constrain the Sudanese military’s operations, thereby limiting its positive influence on collective awareness on the ground and shaping public perception of national institutions and their role in safeguarding the country’s assets.
The accelerating political and security developments surrounding Sudan and its regional neighborhood confirm that the Sudanese military institution is the primary and ultimate representative of the legitimacy of the Sudanese national state in the international community, for an indefinite period. Even if current Sudanese military leaders were to agree with some civilian leaders on initiating civil governance, this would not materialize. Sudan, emerging from a fierce war where its sovereignty was contested by major international powers employing full-scale resources, is not yet ready for the establishment of genuine civil rule in the near to medium term. This reality is recognized by Sudanese society, as the consolidation of civil governance first requires broad popular consensus and a politically aware civilian leadership, prioritizing the nation’s interest before citizenship-building. The concept of authority in post-war Sudan resembles that in politically seasoned, operationally experienced, and historically aware states, differing fundamentally from the understanding prevalent in other nations still overcoming largely self-imposed obstacles.
There are nuanced political contradictions and intersections embedded in Sudan’s state structure. While Gulf decision-makers recognize these, they are not prepared to bear the consequences alone, necessitating consultation and consensus to adopt a unified Gulf strategy for post-war Sudan. Decision-makers must consider the following facts to safeguard the future of Gulf engagement in Africa:
Fact One: A broad segment of the military and civilian components affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) “Tasis” government believes there is no central Sudanese “national” leadership to support in the near-to-medium term. Furthermore, senior leaders lack precise knowledge of security and intelligence strategies as understood in Western contexts, particularly regarding Africa. This weakens confidence in the government’s continuity. The international perspective reinforces this view, considering that the RSF lacks real command. Absent the group’s internal disorganization, external actors would not have attempted to exploit it to undermine the national state under the pretext of marginalization. While the international community may not actively support this perception, its acknowledgment is evident in the positions of several internationally affiliated individuals, affecting popular perception across much of Africa. This explains the reluctance to endorse the establishment of a parallel government in Nyala. With growing African political awareness since 2020, each state seeks to preserve national unity and sovereignty, avoiding entanglement in Sudan’s imposed conflict.
Fact Two: Sudan’s regional neighbors recognize a new balance of power emerging in East Africa, and it is preferable to engage constructively. The success of the Sudanese Armed Forces in managing this multi-faceted war—spanning nationalities, orientations, and supply chains—has strategic, security, and political implications for all neighboring states. These countries thus view the establishment of an African “military and intelligence” alliance as necessary.
Fact Three: The “Samoud Alliance” led by Dr. Abdullah Hamdok functions as the civilian arm of the RSF-led “Tasis” military alliance under RSF commander Hemeti. As noted by Said al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, Secretary-General of Samoud, dialogue with Tasis is part of the political vision for achieving peace. While the specifics of this dialogue are unclear, both parties are aware that external visions shaped their post-Bashir environment, creating opportunities to reframe national conflicts. Civilian components within the RSF government, including Samoud, recognize their temporary necessity, legitimizing a currently absent authority, and delineating the operational phase. This contrasts sharply with genuinely popular civil governance and highlights the distinctions between externally crafted and domestically grounded governance systems.
Towards a Sudanese-Gulf Summit (Proposed Recommendations):
- Emphasize Sudan’s sovereignty in all regional and international platforms, support its stability, national independence, territorial integrity, and institutional capacities, and address all underlying destabilizing factors to prevent exploitation by external and regional actors. Promote Sudan’s comprehensive national recovery campaign and identify areas to unify Gulf perspectives on resolving the Sudanese file, establishing cooperative measures to halt the war and contain the crisis. Should efforts fail, Gulf states will bear partial responsibility for emerging security and political developments in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb regions, extending to the Horn of Africa, potentially creating unforeseen geopolitical conditions.
- Develop specialized academic and military cooperation programs between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Gulf national defense colleges. Drawing from Sudan’s operational experience in the recent war against multinational RSF militias, new curricula should address threats from illegal and insurgent groups, exploring strategic, intelligence, and operational mechanisms for countering them. Sudan’s recent military experience serves as a model for collaboration with established African military academies in Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, and Namibia, while acknowledging broader regional security challenges, particularly following Israel’s recent aggression against Qatar, highlighting the vulnerability of Gulf security systems.
- Promote cultural and media cooperation between the Sudanese Ministry of Information and Gulf broadcasting institutions, including the GCC’s media arm and joint production entities. Joint programs showcasing Sudanese history, arts, and heritage will enhance Gulf citizens’ understanding of Sudan’s historical and contemporary role as Africa’s gateway to the Arabian Peninsula, reinforcing Gulf diplomatic influence in Africa.
- Expand Gulf-funded service projects in Sudan, particularly in areas affected by recent conflict. Establish joint Sudanese-Gulf committees to oversee hospitals, schools, universities, religious institutions, charitable organizations, and humanitarian aid projects.
Dr. Amina Al-Araimi
Emirati Researcher in African Affairs
