At the height of the Ethiopian-Egyptian tension over the Renaissance Dam on the one hand, and the apprehension saturated with ill will between Djibouti and Eritrea on the other hand, and the Kenyan-Somali dispute over the maritime border dispute on the third hand, I was monitoring what was being written in the official press in all those countries. I did not stop there, but rather intensified the hours of my cultural council that I held in my home one day a week with the most competent African elites, some of whom I met in school, some of whom I met through field work on the African continent, some of whom succeeded in representing African diplomacy in some Gulf capitals, and some of whom were forced by their curiosity to know who is that Gulf woman who left the comfort of her society and headed to roam the wilderness of Africa until our land became addicted to her, our youth knew her, and she mastered part of our culture. Even if she did not participate in it, is she the daughter of Africa that she did not give birth to, and this is what we hope for? Or is she being directed by some party, and this is what we fear? After a decade of these questions, I find the same eyes that used to look at me with questioning doubt, now filled with reassurance and comfort after the truth of what they had hoped for was proven.
African colleagues, especially in the Horn of Africa region, often discuss with me the vision of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries regarding the renewed tensions between Addis Ababa and Cairo at times, between Asmara and Djibouti at other times, and between Mogadishu and Nairobi at other times. They ask why we do not see in the Gulf press a detailed report issued by the Gulf elites about what is actually happening in our countries in a scientifically correct manner? My answer is that the Gulf reader’s lack of interest in first getting to know the African field scene closely and not reading the original African references issued by the scientific and intellectual elites who abound in the Horn of Africa region to know the reasons for those stifling tensions prevailing in the Horn of Africa region is the obstacle that has always stood as a stumbling block in the way of the Gulf’s awareness of understanding the nature of Africa and the Horn of Africa and what is happening in it. This is what affected the Gulf’s assessment of reading the African reality and the political, social and economic cracks that afflict it. Consequently, there was no real scientific Gulf vision for the Horn of Africa region, let alone the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Today’s international powers do not want to escalate the tension and congestion in the Horn of Africa region. On the one hand, they do not want an escalation in the Ethiopian-Egyptian file and will not allow it to go beyond media statements that do not serve the future of the Nile River or the Renaissance Dam issue as much as they fuel an enmity that is not befitting the peoples of the Nile Basin countries. On the other hand, they do not want the development of the apprehension saturated with bad intentions between Asmara and Djibouti to impose a reality and return the region to 2008 (the events of Tel el-Barr and the island of Domera), and on the third hand, it does not want the Kenyan-Somali tension to develop, whatever its type, but rather wants to maintain the files of the new Somalia, the model of which was drawn to be reached in conjunction with the exemption of Mogadishu from its debts and the return of the US embassy to work in Somalia after three decades of interruption, and at the same time maintain the position that Nairobi has reached in supporting the strategy of international powers in all files (terrorism, economy, energy).
Today, the Horn of Africa region is being pulled by international axes interspersed with regional powers, and we find that coordination between them has reached advanced stages in some files, and between those main axes and the emerging regional powers, we find that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are the weakest link in that pull, and today they have only a set of possible scenarios in the Horn of Africa region.
The first scenario: Federal Somalia is an upcoming force, after Washington reopened its embassy in Mogadishu after decades of closure, followed by the exemption of Somalia from its financial debts. All of this is an indication of the approaching occurrence of radical political changes in Somalia, with which Washington paves the way for its strategy for a new Horn of Africa and preparing Mogadishu to play a new role that it is not accustomed to The Horn of Africa region from Somalia, and here either some Gulf countries find themselves facing a settling of scores with Mogadishu, which is angry about some Gulf trends, or the Gulf countries find themselves facing a new rival that possesses natural resources, human power, and a strategic location that outperforms them, which qualifies it to play the role of a strong competitor in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea.
Second scenario: Isolating each Gulf country from the other. It is likely that international powers will work to prevent the return of Gulf harmony so that they can isolate each Gulf country from the other and use this Gulf discord in a way that suits their interests, especially since there are certain files in the Horn of Africa and Sudan that international powers do not want to appear before public opinion as being responsible for managing them, even if the matter happens and is revealed, there is a party that bears responsibility and must pay the price, which exposes Gulf interests to further targeting and disappearance.
Third scenario: Somali-Turkish progress. It is likely that security and military cooperation in the Horn of Africa will double between Turkey, Somalia, and some Gulf countries, and Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan may join them in the future in some files or at some stage, and in The difference in political visions of each Gulf state and the future role that each Gulf state wants for itself and in isolation from the other, will naturally lead to more conflict between the Gulf states, not only in the Horn of Africa region, but may extend to the entire African continent, which increases the collapse of the idea of the Gulf Union.
Scenario Four: The lightening of the Ethiopian-Egyptian file, the escalation of the Egyptian-Ethiopian disputes over the Renaissance Dam may double the division between the Gulf states, and here either Cairo finds itself alone without real Gulf support, or some of the Gulf states allied with Cairo abandon Ethiopia and form a front with Egypt, which I rule out, as the Arab Gulf states, even those allied with Cairo, do not want to lose Ethiopia, but may contribute to bringing the viewpoints of the Egyptian and Ethiopian sides closer together to resolve the dispute between them without losing either party, and this is what will limit
It will happen.
Recommendations
• Work to resolve the Gulf crisis immediately and collectively begin to develop a ten-year strategy in which each Gulf state is assigned a specific task. The Gulf states must re-read Africa again, but what hinders this are the political differences between the Arab Gulf states, which must be resolved immediately and work to move forward and not return to the square of pointless differences that are paid for by the future and security of the Gulf citizen.
• Move practically to prove the Gulf Cooperation Council states’ respect for Somali sovereignty and work to support the unity of its territories as an Arab state member of the Arab League and immediately stop any activity that may contribute to destabilizing it and begin supporting the Federal Republic of Somalia by doubling investments, developing infrastructure and supporting the Somali labor market.
• Establish strong economic values for a future Gulf-African bloc, especially since some Gulf states have succeeded in supporting Islamic financing and issuing Islamic bonds in some African countries. This will revive the African economy on the one hand, and keep Gulf funds away from any future political and economic blackmail on the other hand.
• Working to highlight the Gulf point of view to the peoples of the Horn of Africa countries in general and to the Somali people in particular, who believe that the Arab Gulf countries have not made the required “political” effort since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and the events that followed, which contributed to strengthening the rift between some Gulf countries and Somalia and contributed to highlighting a negative Gulf image among a large segment of the Somali people, and this must be corrected before it worsens and becomes a solid obstacle to the Gulf-Somali rapprochement.
• Working to make the Yemen-Djibouti Bridge project, which is planned to be implemented, a success, which will enhance trade exchange between the Horn of Africa countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
• Working to bring the viewpoints of Addis Ababa and Cairo closer together to prevent escalation of the situation and reach a point of agreement that supports Ethiopia’s right to development and reassures Cairo that its water rights will not be infringed upon and preserves Sudanese rights.
• Developing a practical plan for the participation of African books in all Gulf capitals, with the participation of African scientific elites from “sub-Saharan Africa” to enhance Gulf-African cultural communication, which will contribute to bringing the two sides closer together, getting to know those elites, and giving them an opportunity to introduce us to the nature of African societies and thus reach a sound Gulf scientific vision that does not need to be achieved by resorting to foreign expertise that is disturbed by any Afro-Gulf rapprochement that does not pass through it.
The article was published in the Mogadishu Center for Studies and Research on April 14, 2020 at the link Next
سيناريوهات “خليجية” في القرن الإفريقي
The article is published on the Horn of Africa Post website at the link Next
https://hafpost.net/articles-and-analyzes/19625
Dr. Amina Al Arimi
Emirati researcher in African affairs
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