I deeply regret the recent deterioration in Sudanese–Emirati relations, which have reached a critical juncture. I can only describe this situation as a “regression in reversal”—what I see, in modern international relations terminology, as a case of “rupture structurelle.” This term, coined by French historian Raymond Aron, refers to a structural rupture within the evolving framework of the state.
I have long regarded Gulf–African relations in general—and Sudanese–Emirati relations in particular—as the cornerstone of my fieldwork in strategic research across the African continent. I considered it a modest success to have contributed to dispelling numerous political, historical, and security misconceptions entrenched in the African mindset—misconceptions largely stemming from historical accumulations that Gulf actors failed to examine and address before they intensified. These misconceptions became intellectual obstacles that I strived to either overcome or ignore whenever the African Council invited me to engage with its diverse elites across specialties, orientations, religions, and ethnicities. Today’s crisis in Sudanese–Emirati relations has brought me back to square one. It has resurrected the abhorrent terminology I used to hear—terms employed by those seeking to halt my efforts whenever I wrote to defend the historical, religious, and security ties linking the Gulf to Africa.
It is no secret that the recent intensification of drone attacks on Port Sudan is an attempt to halt the political and military gains achieved by the Sudanese Armed Forces following the liberation of Khartoum. Gulf capitals share common ground on some aspects of the Sudanese crisis while differing on others. Riyadh, for instance, sees Sudan’s stability as integral to its maritime security along the Red Sea, viewing this as part of Saudi national security. A further deterioration in Sudan’s internal security could lead to renewed fragmentation and the emergence of new states along Saudi Arabia’s western coastline—an outcome Saudi diplomacy is actively working to prevent. Despite Riyadh’s acknowledgment of the international community’s reluctance to embrace new states in Africa in the short to medium term, continued conflict in Sudan may escalate regional and international interventions in the Red Sea zone. Therefore, Riyadh and Cairo alike seek to halt such developments to protect the security of their western coastal zones. Moreover, Riyadh desires a strong, reliable regional partner along its maritime borders—one that enjoys international and regional legitimacy and can contribute to Red Sea maritime security. Yet, Saudi Arabia remains constrained by its historical caution in dealings with Ethiopia and Eritrea—caution rooted in the political volatility of Asmara and Addis Ababa and how these dynamics shape each country’s view of Saudi regional involvement.
Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, maintains a firm stance against the return of Islamist factions to power in Sudan. Meanwhile, Riyadh, Doha, and Cairo adopt a more pragmatic approach, showing willingness to engage with Islamist parties if such engagement aligns with popular Sudanese consensus. Abu Dhabi rejects this. Its vision prioritizes having a strategic ally along the East African coast, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Red Sea—an approach that explains Addis Ababa’s support for Abu Dhabi’s efforts to prevent Islamist parties and their affiliates from gaining power or international representation.
The RSF (Rapid Support Forces) understands that key international players—chief among them Washington and the European Union—may view the RSF as capable of safeguarding certain interests or implementing foreign agendas. However, these actors do not see the RSF as a viable foundation for a state the size of Sudan, even when politically aligned domestic entities lend their support. Nor is the RSF perceived as the nucleus of a regular national army capable of representing Sudan among the world’s militaries. The RSF fundamentally contradicts the ethos and honor code of professional military institutions, given its structural and psychological composition as an outlaw militia rebelling against the national state.
Scenario One: A return to the pre–March 26, 2025 status quo. The drone strikes on Port Sudan are aimed at halting Sudanese Armed Forces’ gains since the liberation of Khartoum. Despite the RSF’s attempts to reorganize and reclaim lost territory, this scenario seems unlikely due to Khartoum’s new strategy of diversifying allies, modernizing defense systems, and reading the dynamics of the rapidly evolving Sudanese landscape. A growing independent revolutionary Sudanese movement now rejects foreign interference and labels the RSF as a rebel force that has recruited foreign fighters and attacked national institutions. This movement advocates for national sovereignty and supports the military’s right to defend Sudan’s unity. While it may not fully endorse the military’s ideology, it asserts every nation’s right to choose its own system of governance—free from foreign imposition. It also recognizes the weakness of Sudanese political parties and their inability to lead the next phase.
Scenario Two: Continued skirmishes and drone warfare between both parties over the next six months. This scenario would hinder the return of governmental offices, international agencies, and foreign embassies to the capital, Khartoum. This projection is reinforced by recent reports from French intelligence sources indicating that the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) facility in Khartoum will remain isolated from UN agencies until at least January 2026. This is due to the extensive presence of unexploded ordnance across the capital and the urgent need for infrastructure rehabilitation before sovereign ministries, governmental departments, and international organizations can safely return. This scenario will likely persist unless Sudan acquires advanced early-warning and jamming systems, along with enhanced electronic intelligence capabilities to infiltrate and disable drone command-and-control networks.
Scenario Three: The initiation of negotiations between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. Although this is a plausible scenario, it remains unlikely in the near term. A broad spectrum of Sudanese citizens—across various political affiliations—recognize that genuine civilian governance is improbable in the short to medium term. However, a symbolic or externally supervised civilian government appears more aligned with Western preferences. Ultimately, the Sudanese people’s will remains the decisive factor in determining the future of post-Bashir Sudan. Just as the Sudanese public understands the gravity of foreign involvement, it also distinguishes between a civilian government born of legitimate domestic will and one imposed through external patronage. From an African perspective, this distinction underlines growing fears that the national fabric of the Sudanese state is being deliberately dismantled—its institutions hollowed out—and that the RSF is being positioned as a militarized guarantor for sustaining an externally backed civilian regime. This view is increasingly echoed among the Sudanese public and aligns with the Armed Forces’ ongoing efforts to exclude the RSF from Sudan’s political future.
Recommendations and Expectations
In light of the success achieved by the Supreme Committee for Popular Mobilization, launched in early 2024 under the leadership of General Maki Bashir, it is expected that the Committee’s activities will diversify and expand, with a focus on developing structured training programs linked to Sudanese security and military institutions. The Sudanese weapons manufacturing company and the national defense industry system—known as “MASAD”—are projected to undergo significant development. This will likely boost cooperation with Indian defense firms and expand the operations of Turkish defense companies such as TAI, Otokar, and Katmerciler. Emphasis should be placed on the sovereignty of Sudan and the preservation of its stability, national independence, territorial integrity, and both civil and military institutions. An immediate cessation of the unprecedented hostility, hate speech, and inflammatory media campaigns is crucial. These actions are unbecoming of the historic relationship between Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. Political and security visions among the Gulf states should be harmonized and strengthened to safeguard Gulf interests in the African continent. A Sudanese–Emirati Joint Committee should be formed, wherein both sides agree on a third-party mediator to lead negotiations. This process should be conducted under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African Union. Suggested mediators include Qatar or Oman, given their negotiation experience and the international community’s trust in their role in fostering regional peace and security. The African continent is closely monitoring the situation in Sudan. African media across multiple countries have dedicated special discussion programs to dissect the ongoing conflict. This, in turn, may help shape a unified African public opinion regarding broader continental issues. At present, the primary objective of the RSF leadership is to seize control of Al-Fashir—which has become the ‘lifeline’ and the strategic key to legitimizing their parallel peace government. The militia’s return to negotiations is contingent upon gaining control of Al-Fashir. Without it, the so-called Foundational Council will remain limited to broadcasting electronic messages to its followers from Nairobi, a city that is increasingly uneasy about hosting RSF elements amid Kenya’s own mounting internal challenges. The RSF’s delay in launching its parallel government is not a result of failure or mismanagement, but rather a strategic pause intended to reorganize its internal structure—one that was significantly dismantled during the liberation of Khartoum on March 26, 2025. This reorganization is seen as a necessary step to initiate a new political role within Sudan and the surrounding region. Consequently, efforts are expected to intensify to prevent the RSF from securing Al-Fashir ahead of the upcoming rainy season in June.
A scholarly contribution by the researcher is available at the following link:
من نيالا إلى السودان “بداية النهاية”، حواري مع شبكة “MIDIACTU ” الفرنسية(1)
Dr. Amina Al-Arimi
An Emirati researcher specializing in African affairs.
